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Abstract
This paper uses a game theoretic model to investigate the 1993–94 split-up of the main 
German pharmaceutical association into an association for multinational, research-
based companies and an association representing small and medium-sized fi rms. In 
order to explain the breakdown of cooperation among group members, the paper em-
ploys a model that combines collective action and bargaining. The model suggests that 
changing issues can play an important role in organizational change. In the case of the 
German pharmaceutical industry, the key issue changed from pharmaceutical registra-
tion to cost control. With respect to the former issue, the different factions in the phar-
maceutical industry had complementary interests and were able to fi nd a compromise 
position. The latter issue led to a confl ict over the redistribution of scarce resources 
between the factions; formally, this meant that all issue dimensions were equally im-
portant to all factions. As a result, it became impossible to realize policy gains through 
a political compromise.
Zusammenfassung
Die folgende Studie untersucht den Austritt forschender Arzneimittelhersteller aus dem 
Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie (BPI) zum Jahreswechsel 1993/1994 
und die darauf folgende Gründung des Verbands forschender Arzneimittelhersteller 
(VFA). Unter Zuhilfenahme eines spieltheoretischen Modells, das Verhandlungstheorie 
mit der Theorie kollektiven Handelns verbindet, wird hier argumentiert, dass Ände-
rungen im Issuekontext organisatorischen Wandel verursachen können. Im Falle der 
deutschen Pharmainteressen wurde die Zulassung von Arzneimitteln als dominantes 
Issue von der Frage der Kostenkontrolle abgelöst. Im Falle der Arzneimittelzulassung 
konnten die verschiedenen Herstellergruppen Kompromisspositionen erreichen, 
während im Falle der Kostenkontrolle zu einem schwer lösbaren Verteilungskonfl ikt 
zwischen innovativen, OTC- und Nachahmerprodukt-Herstellern führte, der auf die 
Gründung getrennter Verbände hinauslief.
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Introduction
In 1993, more than 100 German and international pharmaceutical companies left the 
German Federal Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (Bundesverband der Phar-
mazeutischen Industrie, BPI), the association that had represented their interests since 
1951. The result was the foundation of two new pharmaceutical associations, one for 
the generics industry, and another for the innovative, multinational companies. The 
latter group, the Association for Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (Verband 
Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller, VFA), quickly replaced the BPI as the most infl uential 
German pharmaceutical association. Its members comprise 60% of the prescription 
drug market, and it accordingly plays an important role in national and international 
fora, such as EFPIA (the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Asso-
ciations) and recently in the German Roundtable in the Health Care Sector (Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung 1993b,d,f). 
Here is a puzzle: Why did an association that had been successful and powerful for more 
than 40 years suddenly break apart? The literature on interest group formation and 
maintenance does not provide conclusive answers. The pluralist tradition (McFarland 
1991; Truman 1951; Vogel 1989) emphasizes the role of social confl ict and the strength 
of the “enemies” of business: If industry interests are threatened, they will organize. This 
is not the case here; the crisis occurred in a period when the pharmaceutical industry 
was on the defensive. Despite the external threat, the industry did not rally around its 
major association but split up into different factions. Rational Choice theorists in the 
Olsonian tradition argue that interest group formation and maintenance is the result of 
a set of selective incentives (Moe 1980; Olson 1965; Wilson 1973). This would suggest 
that groups fail because members are no longer interested in their services. This does 
not fi t the BPI’s case. On the one hand, the split-up in the pharmaceutical industry was 
accompanied by furious intra-group confl icts – members seemed to be very interested 
indeed. On the other hand, the BPI retained a large number of members, which suggests 
that at least some selective incentives might still have worked. 
Building on the Rational Choice approach to interest group formation and maintenance, 
I propose a formal model that will help us to understand cases like the one encountered 
in the German pharmaceutical industry. Similar to Olson, I assume that interest groups 
have to overcome collective action problems, which they can do with the provision of 
selective incentives. However, in contrast to other collective action models, I assume 
that group members do not agree on which collective good they should pursue. The 
collective good consists in the pursuit of a political position, and group members differ 
I thank Pieter Bouwen, Simone Burkhart, David Coen, Jürgen Feick, Fabio Franchino, Lothar Krem-
pel, Andrew McFarland, Wolfgang Streeck, and the participants in seminars at the Max Planck Insti-
tute for the Study of Societies and the School of Public Policy at University College London for their 
help and feedback. Also, I thank several members of German pharmaceutical associations for the 
opportunity to interview them for this project. All shortcomings are the author’s fault.
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in their evaluation of different policies. Therefore, the group has to negotiate a com-
mon position, in addition to dealing with collective action problems. I will show that 
under certain conditions, group organizers can design institutional mechanisms that 
use policy confl ict to overcome collective action problems. If conditions change, groups 
that relied on such institutional mechanisms to ensure cooperation might fail. 
Why should we care? First, if we want to know who infl uences policy, we need to know 
who is well organized, since well-organized interests can communicate their message 
more clearly and infl uence political choices more easily. Second, it has been observed 
that the infl uence of particular social actors changes over time (McFarland 1991; Vogel 
1989). In order to understand the reasons for these fl uctuations in infl uence, we have to 
fi nd the factors that might change. In this paper, I propose that the political agenda is one 
such factor that infl uences the ability of groups to provide incentives for different inter-
ests to cooperate. Third, the case under study is substantively important. The BPI rep-
resented one of the important German industries of the twentieth century. Its crisis has 
alarmed other groups, which are afraid of similar things happening to them.1 If we want to 
understand the process of German pharmaceuticals policy in the second half of the 1990s, 
we have to investigate the factionalization of pharmaceutical interest representation. 
The section following this introduction provides some substantive information on the 
functioning of the BPI before the 1994 split-up, on the main issues that have been impor-
tant for the association since the 1960s, and on the attempts made in 1993 to reorganize 
and save the association. This will serve as a background for the subsequent theoretical 
discussion and the formulation of a game theoretic model. The conclusions drawn from 
the model will then be used to analyze the empirical case; conversely, the empirical case 
provides us with a fi rst informal assessment of the usefulness of the model. The formal 
discussion of the model, including all proofs, can be found in the appendix.
The BPI and pharmaceuticals policy before 1994
The confl ict between research-oriented multinational fi rms and pharmaceutical SMEs 
that led to the split-up of the BPI focused on organizational issues. Therefore, it will be 
useful to survey the BPI’s formal structure.2
Founded in 1951, the BPI is the oldest post-war pharmaceutical association in Germa-
ny.3 In 1984, it represented 506 member companies, which accounted for 95% of phar-
1 Personal interview with a German interest association representative, April 17, 2002.
2 If not otherwise noted, the following is based on Groser (1985).
3 The more specialized Bundesfachverband der Heilmittelindustrie (federal sector association of 
the proprietary medicines industry, BHI), which originally represented only the over-the-coun-
ter sector, was founded a few years later. In the early 1980s, it was renamed Bundesfachverband 
(now Bundesverband) der Arzneimittel-Hersteller, BAH.
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maceutical production in Germany. Since its membership fees constitute a proportion 
of income (0.12% of turnover, of which 0.02 percentage points are used as membership 
fees for the German chemical association), the BPI had comparatively large resources 
and a comparatively large staff. 
Although membership fees are weighted by fi rm size, the BPI’s decision making proc-
esses are rather egalitarian. The association’s main governing body, the general as-
sembly, consists of 80 to 120 delegates selected by the BPI’s regional associations. The 
number of delegates selected within a region depends on its relative membership size, 
which means that the principle “one fi rm – one vote” is the basis of the internal decision 
making process. The general assembly selects the executive committee and some of the 
board members. 
The hierarchical structure of the BPI is based on region, not on sub-sectoral character-
istics. Before the German re-unifi cation, the association was divided into 10 regional 
associations, whose boundaries corresponded to the regional divisions of the German 
chemical industry association (VCI), and roughly to the German Länder. (After re-uni-
fi cation, the regional structure was consolidated into 7 regional associations.) The re-
gional associations select some of the members of the association board. In addition 
to the regional associations, the BPI contains several policy-oriented and sub-sectoral 
committees and sections that deal with specifi c issues such as over-the-counter drugs, 
phytopharmaceuticals, or veterinary medicine. These fora offer opportunities for direct 
fi rm participation. 
Similar to other large German business associations, the BPI has not merely been a lob-
bying group but has also engaged in self-regulatory activities, for example in the areas of 
advertising4 and information directed at physicians. In 1981, the BPI established a codex 
for its members that contained rules and guidelines for advertisement.5 
Violation of these rules was punishable by exclusion from the association. This consti-
tuted a rather powerful selective incentive, since association membership was the pre-
condition for inclusion in the so-called “Red List” of medicines. This list of all medi-
cines produced by BPI members, along with their indications, was sent to practicing 
physicians every year. The fact that the Red List constituted a powerful incentive to join 
the BPI is documented by a court case reported by Groser. This case involved a former 
BPI member who was excluded from the association due to the violation of some of its 
advertising regulations.6 The company sued to have its products included in the Red 
List, but lost. Subsequently, it decided to adhere to the advertising rules and rejoin the 
BPI (Groser 1985: 49). 
4 In Germany, the advertisement of pharmaceutical products to the general public is strictly lim-
ited; public advertisement of prescription medicines, for example, is prohibited.
5 The codex also regulated other areas, such as producer participation in procedures to monitor 
the post-marketing performance of medicines.
6 This case took place before the formulation of the codex, and referred to restrictions regarding 
the size of medicine samples that could be given to physicians.
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Taken at face value, the confl ict of 1993 was about demands by a group of compa-
nies that were organized in the so-called Medical-Pharmaceutical Research Society 
(Medizinisch Pharmazeutische Studiengesellschaft, MPS) to change the BPI’s organiza-
tional structure.7 The main point of criticism was the power of the regional associa-
tions, which, it was argued, led to a cumbersome decision making process. In addition, 
large research-oriented fi rms complained that their infl uence in the BPI was smaller 
than their fi nancial contribution (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1993c). Even after 
the VFA had been founded by the members of the MPS (and other large fi rms), the BPI 
secretariat tried to transform its association into an umbrella group that would be able 
to integrate the VFA as a corporate member. This attempt failed to obtain the required 
two-thirds majority of the December 1993 BPI assembly (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung 1993a,b). 
The diffi culty with such a purely organizational explanation of the 1993 confl ict and 
its consequences is that the BPI was able to work very effectively for more than four 
decades before the break-up. Also, for a long time, the industry had been divided into 
large companies involved in research-oriented production for an international market 
and SMEs focusing mostly on generics and other less research intensive medicines for a 
domestic market (including phytopharmaceuticals and homeopathic medicines, which 
are relatively popular in Germany). It is not obvious why these relatively stable factors 
led to the radical change in the early 1990s.
In order to understand the change, we need to look at the changing issues that dominat-
ed pharmaceuticals policy. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the main issue was the reg-
istration of pharmaceuticals, and the criteria used for this process. Beginning in 1961, 
pharmaceuticals had to be registered with the Federal Bureau of Health (Bundesgesund-
heitsamt), and the sale of health-threatening medicines was prohibited. However, it was 
not necessary for producers to prove the safety and effectiveness of their medicines. In 
1964, following the thalidomide affair, documentation of safety and effectiveness were 
required, but the regulations were still not as strict as in other countries, such as the 
United States (Murswieck 1983: 284–287). As international trade in pharmaceuticals 
increased, there was also increasing pressure to adjust registration requirements ac-
cording to WHO guidelines. This pressure came, in part, from large, export-oriented 
companies, whereas smaller companies were reluctant to agree to stricter regulatory 
requirements (Westphal 1982: 213 ff.). In 1976, a new pharmaceuticals law introduced 
stricter registration requirements that – at least partly – followed the American model8 
(Murswieck 1983: 288–289). 
7 The main activities of the MPS focused on public relations and support of basic research rather 
than on political lobbying (Groser 1985).
8 Exceptions are in the areas of phytopharmaceuticals, homeopathic, and other “traditional” 
medicines.
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Since the late 1970s, the so-called health care “cost explosion” has dominated health care 
policy, particularly pharmaceuticals policy. The 1977 Health Insurance Cost Contain-
ment Act reduced the reimbursement of medicines for certain indications (common 
cold etc.), increased prescription fees for patients, and introduced limits on the overall 
pharmaceutical expenses of sickness funds (Webber 1988). In 1989, the fi rst of a series 
of “health reform” laws passed by the center-right government introduced a “negative 
list” of medicines that were excluded from reimbursement by statutory sickness funds. 
In 1991, this list was extended to include not only medicines for indications that were 
routine and not dangerous, but also medicines with low economic value or low thera-
peutic effectiveness. Furthermore, the 1989 law introduced a system of so-called “fi xed 
prices” for medicines using the same therapeutic substances (this system was later to 
be extended to medicines with similar therapeutic substances). Sickness funds would 
reimburse only the fi xed prices, and patients had to pay the difference between the fi xed 
and the actual price (Schneider et al. 1993).9
The price control measures of 1977 and 1989 primarily affected producers of non-in-
novative medicines. These medicines were either subject to price controls, or they had 
to be paid for by patients, which reduced the eagerness of doctors to prescribe them. In 
contrast, the 1992 Health Care Structural Reform Act affected the large, innovative com-
panies. It introduced a budget for the pharmaceutical expenses of the statutory sickness 
funds, increased patient co-payments for medicines, and imposed a fi ve-percent price 
reduction on medicines not subject to fi xed prices (Blanke/Perschke-Hartmann 1994; 
Kirkman-Liff 1999; Perschke-Hartmann 1993). Since physician compensation would 
be reduced if budgets were exceeded, physicians were careful when prescribing particu-
larly expensive medicines – a practice that particularly affected the innovative, patented 
medicines. Furthermore, innovative medicines tended not to be subject to fi xed prices, 
and were therefore subject to the mandatory price reduction. 
It is interesting to see that the three major issues in pharmaceuticals regulation since the 
1960s provoked a division of interests between large, innovative, multinational compa-
nies and small and medium-sized companies targeting the German domestic market. 
The question is: Why did it take until the 1990s for these confl icts to lead to the forma-
tion of separate associations for the two factions of pharmaceutical producers? 
The following theoretical considerations attempt to provide an answer by investigating 
the interaction between the structural characteristics of the BPI and the nature of the 
salient issues.
9 The fi xed prices would be determined by the associations of physicians and sickness funds 
(Webber 1989).
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A theory of coalition building in interest groups
Beginning with Olson (1965), the existing literature has focused on interest group crea-
tion and maintenance rather than group failure and change.10 The reason for this is well 
known: The pluralists had assumed that interest group formation was basically auto-
matic, and Olson argued that there was a problem – that is, a collective action problem. 
Failure was considered the default; group creation had to be explained. The question 
of group failure and change was addressed, if at all, only as a minor topic, or implicitly. 
Wilson (1973: 31), for example, mentions a number of factors that constitute threats to 
organizational maintenance. However, the issue has not received systematic attention. 
The lack of attention to interest group failure is not such a terrible problem, since ex-
planations of group success also imply explanations of failure. I will build here on these 
implicit explanations of failure, and for that purpose I will summarize the main argu-
ments that we can fi nd in the literature. However, I will maintain that these arguments 
either do not help us understand the case being investigated in this paper, or are not 
suffi ciently formalized to be applied to specifi c cases. This paper intends to remedy that 
situation. 
Olson’s formal model suggests only one condition for the provision of collective goods: 
The existence of a privileged group – that is, the presence of one group member whose 
benefi ts from the provision of the collective good are so high that she prefers to provide 
the good on her own. Since it is clear, empirically, that there are circumstances under 
which non-privileged groups (Olson calls them “latent” groups) organize, Olson pro-
vides additional arguments to explain group formation. The most important of those 
arguments relate to the size of the groups and the provision of selective incentives. 
The theory of selective incentives is a straightforward extension of Olson’s model: Con-
tributions to the provision of a collective good are associated with the receipt of a pri-
vate good. Equivalently, the refusal to contribute to the collective good subjects the 
defector to punishment. As a result, the collective good is the by-product of the provi-
sion of private goods. In contrast, the argument that small groups are more likely to 
overcome collective action problems is not clearly linked to Olson’s formal model. His 
argument – smaller groups have lower organizational and monitoring costs, and they 
can use social incentives – does not directly follow from his main argument. Later stud-
ies show that the small-group argument is not necessarily compatible with Olson’s basic 
model (Sandler 1992). 
10 In fact, the question of internal interest group politics has been somewhat out of fashion. Re-
search has focused more on the political infl uence of competing lobbyists (Andersen/1995; Aus-
ten-Smith 1993; Austen-Smith/Wright 1992; Wright 1996) or on analyses of systems of interest 
representation (Falkner 2001; Gray/Lowery 1988; McFarland 1991; Streeck/Schmitter 1991) 
and not on organizational foundation or maintenance. This means that the question of group 
failure has been even further neglected.
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Authors such as Wilson (1973) and Moe (1980) extend the concept of selective incen-
tives, identifying various types of them. Wilson distinguishes between material, specifi c 
and collective solidary, and purposive incentives (32–47). Moe emphasizes non-eco-
nomic incentives: In addition to purposive and solidary incentives, he mentions norms, 
peer pressure, and the impact of authority. 
The emphasis on selective incentives, however, prompted the question of whether the 
argument did not replace one collective action problem with another: If selective incen-
tives were provided to induce cooperation, there were positive externalities involved, 
and the selective incentives therefore also had characteristics of collective goods. The 
solution was found in organization theory, particularly in the concept of the entrepre-
neur. Political entrepreneurs were identifi ed as those actors who organize contributions 
to collective goods and supply selective incentives (Frohlich et al. 1971; Moe 1980; Wil-
son 1973). The behavior of entrepreneurs, in turn, was explained by the existence of 
opportunities to profi t from the organization of groups. With respect to interest groups, 
entrepreneurs could make a living as association secretaries. 
What are the implications that we can draw from the Olson-Wilson-Moe line of argu-
ment for an explanation of interest group failure? First, Olson’s size argument would 
suggest that group maintenance becomes more diffi cult as the number of potential 
group members increases. This argument has to be interpreted subtly, however, since 
Olson’s concept of group size is somewhat unusual: The size of a group is the mini-
mum number of members who can gain from cooperation.11 Therefore, one hypothesis 
might be (roughly): As those members of the group who value the collective good most 
lose interest in the good, it is more likely that the group will dissolve. With respect to 
interest groups, this means that groups decline if the political process and its outcomes 
diminish in importance for their members. 
Second, the selective-incentives argument implies that interest groups fail if the selec-
tive incentives they provide lose value or cannot be provided anymore. This argument 
is more complex and diffi cult than it seems to be at fi rst glance. We should expect en-
trepreneurs to supply other selective incentives if one should fail. However, it is possible 
that the supply of “new” selective incentives might be too costly for the entrepreneur to 
pursue. In addition, it might not even be possible to produce new selective incentives 
that can replace the ones that have lost their value. For the researcher, it is very diffi cult 
to determine which possible selective incentives are available in a particular case. In fact, 
the defi nition of the set of available selective incentives is part of the game of interest 
group formation; the entrepreneur’s imagination and inventiveness are important fac-
tors in this regard. Therefore, it is very diffi cult to investigate empirically whether it was 
the lack – or the cost – of selective incentives that led to group failure. 
11 For a smaller number of members, it would not be worth cooperating because their costs of co-
operation exceed the aggregate gain from the collective group. The smallest group is a privileged 
group; this implies that there is one member who prefers to provide the collective good on her 
own.
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Third, the role of the entrepreneur suggests potential explanations for interest group 
failure. If the supply of able secretaries in a particular sector declines, some groups 
might lack effective organizers as staff members retire or join other organizations. The 
reason for such a decline in competent entrepreneurs could be the relative decline of 
the profi tability of group organization as compared to other entrepreneurial projects. 
Again, this might be related to lack of interest in the group, for example as politics 
becomes less important for an industrial sector. Empirically, however, this argument 
is not particularly credible: In particular, the existence of large consultancies that of-
fer commercial organizational support indicates that interest groups are commercially 
worthwhile, from an entrepreneur’s perspective. Furthermore, their existence suggests 
that entrepreneurial resources are available. 
There are two further strands of argument about the formation of interest groups that 
should be mentioned here. First, empirically oriented studies of interest groups have 
noted the importance of the interaction between a group and its environment (Moe 
1980; Schmitter/Streeck 1999). With respect to political interest groups, the role of the 
government can be very important. In the European Union context, for example, the 
European Commission has been important as a sponsor of some groups (for example, 
BEUC). The role of business associations in regulatory policy making can lead to rather 
powerful selective incentives (for example, because physician reimbursement by statu-
tory sickness funds is channeled in Germany through regional doctors’ associations, 
only physicians who are association members can receive reimbursement). The decline 
of some groups, therefore, can be the result of government policy; an example is the 
decline of British labor unions as a result of neo-liberal policies. Deregulation can also 
lead to a decline in the self-regulatory activities that groups perform, and hence to a loss 
of selective incentives. In addition, the change in salient policy issues might reduce the 
relevance of politics to the group members, and thereby reduce the value of collective 
behavior. 
Lastly, theories of conditional cooperation argue that cooperation can be an equilib-
rium outcome of games in which the decision of one actor to cooperate can be made 
conditional on the cooperation of other actors. For example, Axelrod shows that in 
repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma games, cooperation can be a Nash equilibrium strategy 
(1984).12 In order for this to happen, however, the actors have to have a large time ho-
rizon. A possible explanation for group failure, therefore, could be that it has become 
more likely that the interaction between groups will end in the near future. In other 
words, group failure could be the result of a self-fulfi lling prophecy. The problem with 
this argument is that it is diffi cult to determine what ending interaction would mean in 
an interest group context. In formal terms, it means that the game ends (or is likely to 
12 Other conditions for conditional cooperation have been noted. Hardin (1982), for example, 
discusses overlapping group activities – that is, the possibility that a set of actors will interact 
in different contexts. Defection in one context can then be punished by defection in another 
context.
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end) in the near future. Does this mean that the relevance of the political arena is likely 
to vanish for a particular group? Does it mean that some group members will cease to 
exist – for example, due to economic problems? 
Some explanations of group failure that I deduced from the existing literature are not 
applicable to the case that I am investigating here. The argument that group members 
lose interest due to the declining relevance of politics for their industry is not useful 
because the breakup of the BPI happened at a time when the government was interven-
ing heavily in the pharmaceutical market: Politics was highly relevant; the breakup was 
accompanied by strong political confl icts within the group. It does not seem plausible 
that it was a lack of political entrepreneurship that caused the crisis. In fact, the BPI’s 
executive director during the crisis, Hans Rüdiger Vogel, was actively trying to change 
the association in a way that could accommodate the dissenters’ demands (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 1993e). In addition, the fact that the BPI’s split-up led to the for-
mation of two new associations indicates that there was not a lack of entrepreneurship. 
With respect to conditional cooperation, the interaction between different actors in the 
pharmaceuticals sector was not likely to end any time soon – and it hasn’t ended yet 
(although some actors now belong to different associations). 
Which elements of the existing theories are useful for the case under study? First of all, 
selective incentives are important. I will show that one of the problems turned out to be 
the fact that the most powerful selective incentive was not a purely private good. How-
ever, the failure of selective incentives cannot provide the complete picture. If it is only 
the loss of selective incentives that leads to group failure, we should observe a relatively 
peaceful dissolution – members simply lose interest. As I have already mentioned, this 
was not the fact in the present case. Second, the nature of political issues is important. 
We will see that changing political issues played a major role in destabilizing the asso-
ciation. 
A third element that will be important in the present analysis is the heterogeneity of 
group members. However, I approach heterogeneity in a manner that is different from 
Olson’s. For Olson (and other collective action theorists), heterogeneity refers to the 
question of how highly different actors value the benefi ts of collective action. These 
valuations are basically fi xed. I argue, in contrast, that the heterogeneity of group mem-
bers does not stem from the fact that some demand more or less of a good, but rather 
from the fact that different actors demand substantively different goods. 
In order to model the substantive heterogeneity of interests in a group, I make use of 
concepts employed in theories of bargaining. In particular, I argue that we can use so-
called spatial models to analyze the different political options that different actors pre-
fer, and we can determine which compromise positions lead to different levels of utility 
for the various actors (Enelow/Hinich 1984). As a result, I combine an investigation of 
collective action and bargaining. 
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The combination of bargaining and collective action allows me to introduce a type 
of mechanism for conditional cooperation that is different from the one proposed by 
Axelrod. In my model, the actors can make their contribution to the collective good 
conditional on their infl uence in the bargaining process. This means that under certain 
conditions, collective action can be individually rational. This is where the nature of 
political issues comes in: The mechanism of conditional cooperation that I propose is 
strong (that is, all actors strictly prefer to cooperate) only if the political issues – and, 
accordingly, the actors’ utility functions – have certain characteristics that I will defi ne 
in the following model.
Basic assumptions
Let us assume that there are three factions13 attempting to infl uence pharmaceuticals 
policy. We call one of them SME and another MNC. Although the names are purely 
coincidental and do not infl uence the results of this investigation, let us say that SME 
is a faction of small and medium-sized pharmaceutical companies, and MNC consists 
of multinational, research-oriented companies. The third faction that tries to infl uence 
policy, SHI, can be thought of as representing statutory health insurances. At the start of 
the game, SME and MNC form a coalition, which we call BPI. We are mainly interested 
in the question of whether SME and MNC will continue their coalition or whether they 
will dissolve it. We are not interested in SHI’s strategy; we include it in the model to in-
crease realism, although, as it turns out, we could just as well leave it out of the model. 
The different factions make policy proposals on pharmaceuticals policy; the factions 
that are part of a coalition make a common policy proposal. I formalize this with a 
spatial model, using weighted Euclidean distances as a basis for utility functions. I as-
sume that there is a two-dimensional policy space. For example, let us say that the issue 
is cost controls. Then we can say that one dimension represents the overall reduction 
in medicine prices, and a second dimension represents whether the price reduction af-
fects mostly innovative medicines or generics. As a further example, consider the issue 
of pharmaceuticals registration. Again, we can identify a two-dimensional policy space. 
One dimension is the strictness of registration controls, and the other dimension is the 
degree of governmental or industrial control of regulatory decisions. 
For each faction, we can identify the highest policy preferences using so-called ideal 
points – that is, points in the policy space that identify each faction. I use the symbols 
iSME , iMNC, and iSHI, to identify the ideal points of the three factions. 
13 I use the term “faction” here in the Madisonian sense – factions in society. I prefer this term to 
other possible choices – “groups,” “interests,” etc. – because it is general, indicates difference of 
interest, and we do not easily confuse factions with organized associations.
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The policy benefi t each faction receives from a policy outcome is based on the distance 
between its ideal point and the outcome. We conceptualize the policy outcome as a 
point, o, in the (two-dimensional) policy space, so that o = (ox,oy). We then say that the 
policy benefi t for a faction – I use SME as an example – is the negative of the distance 
between its ideal point and the outcome:
– ||iSME – o ||SME = –   (iSME,x – ox)2 + (iSME,y – oy)2. (1)
Now, this conceptualization of SME ’s benefi t assumes that the faction evaluates both 
policy dimensions of the issue equally. This might make sense for an issue such as cost 
reduction: SME wants little overall cost reduction, and larger cost-reduction for in-
novative medicines (which tend to be produced by the larger companies). However, 
this might not be true for other issues. Take, for example, pharmaceuticals registration: 
It has been argued that MNCs preferred stricter registration requirements that would 
increase their products’ international competitiveness. In addition, they preferred a 
relatively high level of government control to assure confi dence in international mar-
kets (in contrast, SMEs preferred a lower level of government control than the CMEs; 
cp. Westphal [1982: 217 ff.]). However, strictness of registration requirements was the 
more important issue from the MNCs’ perspective, whereas the implementation of the 
requirements was secondary. Let us say that strictness is represented by the x-axis of the 
policy space (outcome ox), and government control by the y-axis (outcome oy). Then, 
MNC’s policy benefi t would be
– ||iMNC – o ||MNC = –   αMNC,x  (iMNC,x – ox)2 + αMNC,y (iMNC,y – oy)2 (2)
with αMNC,x  > αMNC,y . In technical terms, the policy benefi t is conceptualized as a nega-
tive weighted Euclidean distance (Enelow/Hinich 1984).
The different factions have lobbying budgets, which I denote by bMNC, bSME, and bSHI, 
respectively. I assume that the factions spend all of their lobbying budgets. The rationale 
for this assumption is the fact that, once lobbying budgets are allocated, their costs are 
sunk and it is rational to spend them.14 
The main question that the model poses is whether SME and MNC maintain their coa-
lition, in the form of an association. I assume that there is a political entrepreneur who 
organizes the association, and who prefers for the association to exist.15 The entrepre-
neur has to submit an association policy proposal and offer selective incentives. There 
are several actors who can be such political entrepreneurs. Usually, it is an association’s 
secretariat that plays this role, by proposing and negotiating association positions and 
arranging for the services that an association provides (such as information about im-
portant policy issues, studies on industry developments, etc.). 
14 Strictly speaking, then, this is not an assumption but a proposition that can be proven; I state it 
as an assumption to save space.
15 We can formalize this by saying: If the association is successfully established, the entrepreneur 
receives a utility of 1; otherwise, she receives a utility of 0.
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I assume that the factions, or the coalition/association, are agenda setters in the sense 
that one of their proposals becomes policy. This assumption is based on the considera-
tion that more resources are required from policy makers – mostly in terms of expertise 
– to develop independent policy proposals. Such a resource-based argument is par-
ticularly credible in highly technical policy areas such as health care policy. The agenda 
setting role of factions can be implicit in the sense that they may not make a proposal at 
the beginning of the policy process. They may just as well defend the status quo, which 
implies that they do not propose a new policy solution. They are agenda setters, how-
ever, in the sense that one of their (implicit) proposals will become the government’s 
policy choice. 
The probability that a faction’s policy proposal will become law depends upon the re-
sources that the faction puts into lobbying for the proposal. This probability is based 
on Tullock’s ratio probability model (1980). As an example, assume that MNC spends 
its entire budget lobbying for its ideal point, iMNC , and that nobody else lobbies for this 
policy. Then, the probability that iMNC will become law is
SHISMEMNC
MNC
MNC
bbb
b
ip
++
=)( .
 
(3)
Now, assume that the entrepreneur has proposed association policy c, and SME decided 
to contribute a share of its budget – call it SMEbˆ  – to support c. Similarly, MNC decides 
to support c with MNCbˆ . Then, the probability that c becomes law is
SHISMEMNC
SMEMNC
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The utilities that the factions realize at the end of the game consist of the possible policy 
benefi ts (that is, the negative Euclidean distances), weighted by the probabilities of their 
implementation, plus the selective incentives, s, provided by the entrepreneur. Taking 
MNC as an example,
uMNC = – p(c)||iMNC – c||MNC – p(iSME)||iMNC – iSME ||MNC
– p(iSHI)||iMNC –iSHI ||MNC +s (4)
(||iMNC –iMNC ||= 0, therefore this term drops out of the equation).
The game sequence can be summarized as follows: 
A political entrepreneur proposes a coalition (association) between SME and MNC. 
This includes proposing a common policy position and offering selective incentives 
for joining the association. 
The two factions consider which share of their lobbying resources they should con-
tribute to the coalition/association, and which share they should spend on lobbying 
for their own most preferred policy. 
1.
2.
Broscheid: Organizational Change in German Pharmaceutical Interest Representation 17
All actors lobby, and the government chooses one of the proposed policies and im-
plements it. Utilities are realized.
The formal solution of the game is presented in the appendix; in the following section, 
I provide a less technical discussion of the results. First, I discuss the results that occur 
when the entrepreneur presents a constant association policy – that is, a policy that 
cannot be changed by the factions that join the association. This produces the classical 
free-rider result. After that, I present the results that occur under a mechanism that 
allows for association members to infl uence the association policy proposal. In parti-
cular, I examine institutional mechanisms under which the location of the proposal is 
contingent on the contributions of the association members.
Constant association policy: The free-rider outcome
Let us assume that the entrepreneur proposes a specifi c coalition policy, c, that is a “con-
stant point” in the policy space. This means that this point will be association policy, 
independent of which faction is a member of the association, and which share of its 
lobbying resources it contributes. We can say: 
Proposition 1 Assume that c is a constant and s = 0. Then SMEbˆ = MNCbˆ = 0.
In other words, neither SME nor MNC will contribute to the association if they cannot 
infl uence the common policy and if there are no selective incentives. This is similar to 
the classic free-rider outcome that individually rational actors tend not to contribute 
to common goods. The proof for this proposition is simple. Take SME as an example: 
Since MNC ’s contribution to c is a constant – that is, not infl uenced by SME ’s contri-
bution – SME maximizes its expected policy benefi t by lobbying for its most preferred 
policy. Since the equivalent holds for MNC, there will be no cooperation between the 
two actors. 
The free-rider result stated in Proposition 1 differs from Olson’s collective-action prob-
lem. First, Olson does not necessarily conclude that there will be no cooperation. Instead, 
he argues that contributions to the collective good would be suboptimal, although un-
der certain circumstances they could be positive. Here, the result is that there will be no 
contributions to the association policy. Second, Olson assumed that the common good 
would be preferred by both actors. Here, this is not always the case, as I show below. 
The question, then, is: When does an association benefi t both actors? In other words, 
when do the two factions become victims of a Prisoners’ Dilemma situation in which 
cooperation would be benefi cial but not individually rational? 
3.
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In order to answer this question, we have to compare the factions’ expected utilities un-
der independent lobbying with their utilities under cooperation. For argument’s sake, 
let us assume that each faction either spends its entire budget on its own policy propos-
al, or contributes everything to the association. Then, in the case of SME, the benefi ts of 
mutual cooperation are weakly larger than its utility from non-cooperation if
–  
bSME+bMNC 
||iSME – c || SME
bSME + bMNC + bSHI 
–  
bSHI 
|| iSME – iSHI || SME
bSME + bMNC + bSHI
≥  
bMNC 
|| iSME – iMNC || SME
bSME + bMNC + bSHI
–  
bSHI 
||iSME – iSHI || SME ,
bSME + bMNC + bSHI
which can be simplifi ed to 
–   
bMNC 
||iSME – iMNC ||SME ≥ ||iSME –c || SME .  (5)
bSME + bMNC
Similarly, from MNC’s benefi t: 
–   
bSME 
||iSME – iMNC||MNC ≥ ||iMNC –c||MNC. (6)
bSME + bMNC
It is easy to show that equations 5 and 6 hold with equality if 
ĉ = ( bSME iSME ,x +  bMNC iMNC,x , bSME + bMNC  bSME + bMNC
 bSME iSME ,y +  bMNC iMNC,y bSME + bMNC  bSME + bMNC   ). (7)
That is, c~ is a point on the line connecting iSME and iMNC. Now, if we fi nd a point in 
the policy space that both MNC and SME prefer to ĉ, then a coalition between the two 
actors produces policy benefi ts, and Proposition 1 refers to a situation resembling a Pri-
soners’ Dilemma. I give the geometric intuition of the argument here; the formal proof 
is in the appendix. 
Consider the policy benefi t measure proposed in equation 2. If the “α” parameters in 
this equation are equal, the actor values both issue dimensions equally. We can plot 
equation 2 on a system of coordinates that represents the two issue dimensions; the 
result is a circular indifference curve, consisting of all points that supply the actor with 
the same policy benefi t. 
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If both SME and MNC have circular indifference curves16 – that is, if they value the issue 
dimensions equally – their indifference curves that contain ĉ will intersect exactly at ĉ, 
but at no other point (see Figure 1). Since each actor strictly prefers all points (and only 
those points) that are within the indifference curve to those that are on or “outside” the 
indifference curve, there are no policy choices that both SME and MNC prefer to ĉ. As a 
result, the lack of cooperation under proposition 1 does not lead to any expected policy 
losses.
Now, consider the situation in which not all “α” parameters are equal. In particular, 
assume that
αSME,x ≠ 
αMNC,x
αSME,y αMNC,y
.
In this case, the indifference curves of SME and MNC that go through ĉ intersect such 
that there are points inside both curves. As a result, there are policy positions that both 
SME and MNC prefer to ĉ. This means that cooperation can lead to positive policy 
gains, and the lack of cooperation in proposition 1 describes a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The 
following lemma describes the conditions for this to happen: 
Lemma 1 If 
αSME,x ≠ 
αMNC,x
αSME,y αMNC,y , 
then mutual cooperation can lead to positive policy gains, compared to independent 
lobbying by SME and MNC.
16 An alternative condition is that 
αSME,x = 
αMNC,x
αSME,y αMNC,y .
SME
MNC
SHI
Figure 1 Two actors with equal evaluation of policy dimensions
ĉ
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Substantively, this means that policy gains are possible if both factions evaluate the issue 
dimensions differently, so that they can trade policy concessions on one issue dimen-
sion against policy gains on another dimension. Compare fi gure 2: In the case in which 
the indifference curves are oval-shaped, both MNC and SME prefer c to ĉ.
Independent of the shape of the factions’ indifference curves, if association policies 
are constant, the entrepreneur has to provide selective incentives. There are different 
ways to conceptualize selective incentives. For example, the entrepreneur could pay a 
selective incentive to faction l (I use l and k as wildcards for the different factions) that 
is a continuous function of its contribution in support of the association policy: s(bι). 
In other words, if an actor contributes a larger share of his budget to the coalition, then 
he will receive a larger selective incentive; the function s(bι) determines to what extent 
contributions to the coalition “translate” into selective incentives. We can then show 
(see the appendix):
Lemma 2 If )ˆ( lbfs = , then ll bb =
ˆ  if 
lll
MNCSMEl
l bbci
bbb
bs
≤≤−
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>
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1
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(8)
where c~ is the common policy proposal.
This means that the entrepreneur can induce a faction to contribute its entire resources 
to the coalition if the selective incentives react strongly enough to changes in contri-
butions. Also, Lemma 2 shows that (marginal) selective incentives have to increase as 
the distance between a faction’s ideal point and the proposed coalition policy increases. 
This is very intuitive: An actor makes larger policy concessions when he joins the group 
only if his concession is compensated by a larger selective incentive. 
Figure 2 Two actors with unequal evaluation of policy dimensions
SME
MNC
SHI
c
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Association policy as a function of member contributions
We have confi rmed that coalition building between political actors leads to free-rider 
problems, even if the two actors have different interests. The two main solutions to the 
free-rider problem are selective incentives (which are part of the model) or conditional 
contributions. I propose an implementation of the conditional contribution mecha-
nism that is based on the conditional defi nition of the common good – that is, the 
policy position. This is a practice commonly encountered in interest groups: The idea 
is that those actors who contribute more to the interest group have a stronger infl uence 
on determining its policy goals. At the very least, actors who do not contribute do not 
have the right to infl uence the group policy. 
I incorporate the idea of conditional association policies by assuming that the politi-
cal entrepreneur does not propose a particular policy, but rather establishes a decision 
making process that determines c. Under this process, c moves closer to iSME if SME 
contributes more of its budget to the association, and it moves closer to iMNC if MNC 
contributes more. 
Here, I propose a very simple version of this argument. Suppose we use the following 
mechanism to determine c :
if bˆ SME = bSME and bˆ MNC = 0
if bˆ MNC = bMNC and bˆ SME = 0
if bˆ MNC = bMNC and bˆSME = bSME
if bˆ MNC = 0 and bSME = 0
iSME
iMNC
c~
k
In effect, the entrepreneur gives each faction the choice of contributing its entire budget 
to the association, or of contributing nothing. If both factions contribute their budgets, 
the association will pursue a common policy; if only one faction contributes its budget, 
the entrepreneur will pursue the contributing faction’s ideal policy. 
Of course, there are other mechanisms that we could think of. In particular, a more 
general mechanism would be one in which each faction splits up its budget between 
a “private” policy and the association policy in any way it likes. The solution to this 
mechanism, however, depends on the exact shape of the relationship between policy 
and contributions. In some cases, this makes the derivation of solutions very diffi cult. 
In other cases, it can be shown that the factions either prefer to contribute their entire 
budgets or nothing at all. As a result, under a number of conditions, our simplifying 
mechanism is endogenous to the game. 
In addition, the simple mechanism that I propose here is fairly realistic. Association fees 
tend to be a fi xed amount determined by the associations. Members either join and pay 
{c =
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the demanded fee, or they stay outside; they usually do not have a choice between dif-
ferent fee levels. 
This institutional setup transforms the game and offers an institutional solution to the 
collective action dilemma: 
Proposition 2 If c is determined according to equation 9, there exists at least one c 
such that both actors weakly prefer to pool their lobbying resources in favor of c, even 
in the absence of selective incentives. 
While with constant association policy – and without selective incentives – defection 
(that is, bˆ = 0) is a dominant strategy, with conditional association policies it is weakly 
dominated. If a faction remains in the association, it can never be worse off than with 
independent lobbying, and under some conditions it can be better off. 
Staying in the association is a strictly dominant strategy if the association policy makes 
both factions strictly better off, compared to independent lobbying. The conditions for 
this have been already noted above: If, for both factions,
αSME,x = 
αMNC,x
αSME,y αMNC,y ,
there is no point in policy space that both actors strictly prefer as association policy. 
However, if
αSME,x ≠ αMNC,xαSME,y αMNC,y
,
then the entrepreneur can propose an association policy that induces both actors to join 
the coalition. 
Intuitively, this result means that if both factions evaluate the issue dimensions differ-
ently, and if the different evaluations are partly complementary, then forming a coali-
tion produces a “policy surplus” that an entrepreneur can use to maintain an associa-
tion. In this case, no selective incentives are necessary. However, if both factions evaluate 
the two policy dimensions equally, cooperation does not produce any policy benefi ts 
beyond those of independent lobbying; the entrepreneur can therefore induce coopera-
tion by offering a minimal selective incentive, ∈.
Summary of results
The model that I use to analyze the break-up of the BPI and the founding of the VFA 
produces hypotheses about the conditions under which associations require selective 
incentives to organize, and about the size of those selective incentives. Table 1 summarizes 
these hypotheses. First, the model presented here suggests that it is important for coali-
tion policies to refl ect the relative contributions of different factions (“responsive c~”). 
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If a faction contributes more to the lobbying efforts of the coalition/association, then it 
has to have more infl uence on the coalition’s policy position. If coalition policy is not 
responsive to member contributions (“exogenous c~”), selective incentives are needed to 
convince the factions to join the coalition. 
Second, even with responsive coalition policies (i.e., those that refl ect member contri-
butions), selective incentives are necessary if members attach equal weights to different 
issue dimensions (SME,x = MNC,x and SME,y = MNC,y). These selective incentives can 
be minimal (ε as a symbol for a small amount), compared to the selective incentives 
under non-responsive coalition policies. If members attach differing weights to the is-
sue dimensions (SME,x ≠  MNC,x and/or SME,y ≠MNC,y), no selective incentives are 
necessary if coalition policies are responsive.
Back to German pharmaceutical interests
Now, how can we use the theoretical arguments made in the previous section to explain 
the break-up of the BPI? We have to explain not only why the big members left the as-
sociation, but also why it happened in the early 1990s. 
I argue that there were two changes whose consequences can be appreciated using my 
theoretical arguments. First, the dominant issues changed; second, the effectiveness of 
the association’s selective incentives changed. 
Table 1 Policy benefi ts and necessary selective incentives
Changing issues: Safety versus price control
In section 2 of this paper, I argue that we can distinguish three general periods in phar-
maceuticals policy. The fi rst period, from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, was domi-
nated by the issue of pharmaceutical safety; it resulted in the new pharmaceuticals law 
Policy benefi ts
of cooperating s
exogenous c~ ≤ 0 ≥
responsive c~
SME,x = MNC,x
and SME,y = MNC,y 0
SME,x ≠ MNC,x
and/or SME,y ≠ MNC,y > 0 0
ε
ε
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of 1976. The second and third periods were dominated by the issue of cost control for 
the statutory sickness funds. Between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, the cost control 
measures affected mostly smaller and non-innovative medicine producers. The cost con-
trol measures of the early 1990s, however, affected the large and innovative producers.
I argue that in all three periods, large innovative producers and SMEs tended to have 
different positions on the issues. With respect to pharmaceuticals registration, however, 
the two factions tended to evaluate the various issue dimensions differently, and a com-
promise was possible. On the issue of cost control, however, this was not the case. 
As I already noted in section 3.1, we can characterize the question of pharmaceuticals 
registration as a two-dimensional problem: On the one hand, the question was to what 
extent the safety and effi cacy of medicines had to be proven; on the other hand, the 
degree to which the implementation of the regulations would be left to the industry 
needed to be determined. As I noted, the large multinationals were interested in stricter, 
credibly enforced regulations that would facilitate the export of their products. The 
smaller, domestically oriented companies were interested in low-cost regulations, which 
implied a low level of requirements and industry-controlled implementation. 
Westphal notes that for the large pharmaceutical companies, it was particularly impor-
tant to incorporate internationally accepted safety and effi cacy regulations into phar-
maceutical registration requirements. The actual implementation of those regulations 
was less important (1982: 219). The domestically oriented pharmaceutical SMEs, in 
contrast, were worried mostly about the possibility of what they thought would be gov-
ernmental and sickness fund interventions into the market (cf. the statements made by 
then-BPI chair Sorge, quoted by Westphal 1982: 218). As a result, SMEs and large com-
panies evaluated the importance of the issue dimensions differently and were able to 
fi nd a compromise: stricter regulatory requirements but rejection of state intervention 
into the market (Westphal 1982: 219).
Did the participation of the two factions in the BPI determine the compromise posi-
tion? This question is diffi cult to answer in detail. However, the fact that the BPI posi-
tion constituted a compromise between the large-fi rm and SME positions suggests that 
the participation of both factions made a difference. It is plausible that non-participa-
tion of, say, the multinational companies in the BPI would have led to the association’s 
rejection of new registration requirements.
The question of pharmaceutical cost control can also be analyzed as a two-dimensional 
issue: On the one hand, the question concerns the extent to which pharmaceutical ex-
penses should be reduced; on the other hand, it concerns the extent to which the reduc-
tion should affect low-cost or high-cost, innovative medicines. The fi rst policy dimen-
sion (the degree to which expenses should be reduced) has a lower limit, which is what 
both factions prefer: They are clearly against reduction in pharmaceutical expenses. As 
far as the other question is concerned, there is a confl ict of interest between SMEs and 
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big innovative companies.17 While cost-cutting measures such as fi xed prices,18 aut-
idem rules,19 or “negative lists” of medicines that will not be reimbursed by sickness 
funds tend to affect the prices of less innovative, low-cost medicines, measures such as 
positive lists,20 budgeting of prescriptions, or price controls of non-generic medicines 
tend to affect the prices of new, higher-priced medicines. Since both factions equally 
prefer less cost control – and equally prefer not to be affected by cost controls – their 
indifference curves have the same shape. Therefore, they cannot expect any strict policy 
gains from cooperation; the association has to be sustained by selective incentives. 
Although a number of cost controls had been implemented since the late 1970s,21 the 
interaction between pharmaceutical SMEs and large companies became clearly redis-
tributive with the 1989 Health Care Reform Act. The reform extended the existing 
negative list, introduced fi xed prices for medicines with the same pharmacological sub-
stances,22 and facilitated price competition – and thus clearly threatened to reduce the 
income of pharmaceutical companies (Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie 
1989; Schneider et al. 1993). Furthermore, the reforms affected in particular the pro-
ducers of generics and medicines for routine indications. 
In this case, it is diffi cult to evaluate whether the BPI’s position was conditional on 
the members’ participation in the association and on the strength of its members. Es-
sentially, the BPI represented the position of the small and medium-sized companies 
– opposing the negative list, fi xed prices, and so on (BPI 1989). Since the large multina-
tionals represented a strong faction of the pharmaceuticals sector, the question remains 
whether they would not have been better off lobbying on their own account. Although 
this question cannot be clearly answered, it is likely that the BPI’s position did not re-
fl ect the relative importance of its members and hence contributed to the tensions be-
tween the two factions. 
17 Obviously, this is a simplifi cation, as many big pharmaceuticals producers also produce gener-
ics and other not-so-innovative medicines, while there are some innovative small companies, 
particularly in the biotechnology sector.
18 In the German system, fi xed prices applied only to “comparable” medicines; the patient had 
to pay the difference between the actual price of a product and the fi xed price (Webber 1989: 
275). In 2001, the German cartel offi ce overturned the determination of fi xed prices by physi-
cians and sickness funds: They are now determined by the ministry of health and the Bundesrat 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2001a,b).
19 Prescription of a pharmaceutical substance instead of a particular brand, requiring the pharma-
cist to issue the least expensive preparation.
20 This is a list which contains all pharmaceuticals that sickness funds will reimburse; new medi-
cines may not be immediately included in this list. Although successive health care reforms an-
nounced that they would introduce positive lists, this has not happened yet.
21 For example, the 1977 Cost Control Act introduced so-called maximum prices for the reim-
bursement of certain medicines and higher patient co-payments, and excluded medicines for 
certain routine indications from reimbursement (Schneider et al. 1993; Webber 1988).
22 It also set a time schedule to introduce fi xed prices for medicines with comparable pharmaco-
logical substances and for medicines with comparable pharmacological/therapeutic effects.
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The reaction of the pharmaceutical MNCs to the 1992 Health Care Structural Act is 
more indicative of the validity of the theoretical framework. The cost controls intro-
duced by the 1992 law affected the innovative pharmaceuticals sub-sector in particular: 
Among other measures, it introduced budgets for prescription medicines paid by the 
sickness funds, and it imposed a fi ve-percent price reduction for those pharmaceuticals 
not subject to fi xed prices (that is, new medicines). In reaction to this, the large innova-
tive producers – particularly the group organized in the Medizinisch-Pharmazeutische 
Studiengesellschaft (Medical-Pharmaceutical Study Society, MPS) – proposed policies 
that reduced pharmaceutical expenses but favored their segment of the market. For 
example, the innovative producers proposed to divide prescription drugs into three 
segments: First, life-saving medicines should be completely paid for by sickness funds; 
second, necessary and effective medicines should be partially reimbursed; and third, 
medicines for minor health complaints should be paid for by the patients (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 1994a,b). These policies were not acceptable to the small and me-
dium sized companies, whose segment of the market would have been particularly af-
fected. 
In addition to the confl ict over policy, the large and innovative companies complained 
about the BPI’s decision making structure. Although they paid higher membership fees, 
big companies had the same voice in the general assembly as small companies. In ad-
dition, the large companies complained that the BPI’s regional structure, which con-
stituted the foundation of equal representation of fi rms, resulted in bothersome and 
slow decision making processes. Their proposal for reform – transforming the direct-
membership association into a mixed association that admitted sub-sectoral groupings 
as corporate members – was rejected by a critical minority of members (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 1993a,b,c). While the distributive confl ict made it impossible for 
the two groups to fi nd mutually benefi cial compromises, the structural confl ict reveals 
that the representational structure did not refl ect the political importance of the differ-
ent segments of the industry. The resulting association policy did not refl ect member-
ship contributions. 
Selective incentives: The changing Red List
Considering that the BPI was unable to maintain a coalition based on policy, we have 
to consider the potential role of selective incentives. The main incentive that had the 
power to keep the association together, despite internal confl icts, was the so-called “Red 
List.” As noted above, only products manufactured by BPI members could be listed. 
Since the list was used by many physicians and dentists to determine which medicine to 
prescribe, losing a place on the list could be economically devastating. 
Why didn’t the Red List prevent the group of large innovative companies from leaving 
the association? The list constituted a selective incentive in the sense that it was possible 
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to exclude defectors from it. However, its benefi ts had to be jointly provided, that is, a 
suffi cient number of fi rms had to participate in the association for the good to be valu-
able. As a result, single defectors could be punished by exclusion from the list. However, 
if a group of fi rms that accounted for approximately 50 percent of the market defected, 
the Red List lost most of its value. This is what happened when the group of fi rms that 
later joined the VFA left the BPI. Since 1996, the Red List has been published jointly by 
the BPI and the VFA (Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie 2001). 
Thus, we have a three-part explanation for the split-up of the BPI: A policy issue that 
did not allow for mutual policy gains; the failure of the decision making process to re-
fl ect the relative political power of the different actors; and the failure of the selective 
incentive in the face of the defection of a large group of members. 
But why did the BPI’s small-fi rm members allow this to happen? Why didn’t they com-
promise to keep the big fi rms in the association? The theoretical discussion suggests that 
due to the fact that the policy issue did not allow for mutual gains from cooperation, 
there was no political reason to cooperate. Interestingly, it was the BPI’s administration 
that tried to keep the big fi rms in the association; the small members were not that eager 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 1993a,b). 
There may have been other factors that the model does not capture. For example, there 
was a cultural confl ict between small-fi rm representatives, usually owners, and large-
fi rm representatives, often managers with an international orientation. This may have 
led to an episode in which a representative of a large multinational was not elected to 
the council, which then increased the tensions between the two groups of fi rms.23 In ad-
dition, it may have been diffi cult for the many small members, or their representatives, 
to coordinate in order to negotiate a compromise with the big fi rms. In this sense, the 
association might have fallen victim to a second-degree collective action problem.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to answer a substantive and a theoretical question. Substan-
tively, I tried to explain why many large pharmaceutical producers left their industry 
association in 1993/1994 and formed a new association that specifi cally represented 
multinational, research-focused fi rms. Theoretically, I proposed a formal model of as-
sociation formation that combined collective action with a bargaining problem. By re-
lating interest group formation to factors that are likely to change over time, I advanced 
a general explanation of interest group change. 
23 Interviews with representatives of German pharmaceutical associations, April 17 and May 14, 
2002.
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The theoretical results are quite intuitive: First, it is important that association poli-
cy refl ects the relative strength of the association members. Second, associations are 
strongest if the issues are multidimensional and if members put different valuations 
on the issue dimensions, as this allows for policy trades. Third, selective incentives can 
keep associations together if nothing else works. As a result, if issues change, internal 
interest group politics change, too. In particular, if redistributive policy issues become 
salient, it is more diffi cult to maintain a coalition of actors who are on different sides of 
the redistribution.
In addition to these common-sense conclusions, the formal model also provides us with 
more subtle insights. For example, although selective incentives can be used to uphold 
an association, they are particularly important if association members evaluate policy 
dimensions similarly. Conversely, selective incentives are not necessary if policy deals 
between members are possible, that is, if members evaluate policy dimensions differ-
ently. In addition, the reliance on selective incentives can be minimized if participation 
in the association is a condition for infl uence on association policy. As a result, although 
selective incentives are always useful, their importance can fl uctuate with policy issues. 
This can lead to changes in the character of an association, from an association based on 
purposive incentives to an association based on selective incentives.24 
Another insight relates to the impact and the nature of power: Powerful factions have to 
be more infl uential in internal association politics than less powerful factions. Power is 
related to the size of a faction’s lobbying budget, which can be expected to correspond 
to a fi rm’s overall size – but it is not identical to it. In any case, egalitarian internal de-
mocracy does not further the maintenance of a voluntary association. 
With respect to this paper’s substantive question, the answer encompasses several of 
the arguments made formally. First, one of the problems that led to the desertion of 
large multinational pharmaceutical companies from the BPI was the egalitarian type 
of democracy. Large and important pharmaceutical producers complained that their 
infl uence in the internal decision making process did not correspond to their politi-
cal weight. Second, the increasing expenditures of statutory sickness funds became a 
prominent issue in the 1980s and 1990s, and the solution was sought in the reduction of 
pharmaceutical expenses. This created redistributive confl icts between factions within 
the pharmaceutical industry that were not easily amenable to compromise. Third, the 
main selective incentive that the BPI relied on was not a pure private good; it could 
only be supplied if a suffi cient number of producers stayed within the association. As 
a result, the incentive was not suffi cient to prevent the group of big companies from 
leaving the BPI. 
24 To use Schmitter and Streeck’s terminology, the association could change from one emphasizing 
the logics of membership and infl uence to one emphasizing the logics of service and effi ciency 
(1999).
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For associations, the results of this study suggest that the relative power of their mem-
bers has to be respected. Members with more political weight have to be given more 
infl uence on association policy than members who are not very politically active. Some-
times implementing this policy is easy, since big members are simply more active in the 
association and constitute political leaders that smaller members respect. However, in 
cases such as that of the BPI, which had a rather egalitarian decision making process, 
small members may be reluctant to reduce their own infl uence on association policy, 
particularly if this may lead to economic losses. In such cases, maintaining an associa-
tion can become a serious challenge. 
For political decision makers – and for citizens as well – the results of this study may be 
somewhat disconcerting. On the one hand, they suggest that interest groups should be 
able to aggregate the political demands of some social sectors. This may be politically 
useful, since it simplifi es democratic decision making processes. On the other hand, the 
compromises reached do not necessarily refl ect the ideals incorporated in modern de-
mocracies – in particular, the political equality of all citizens. Factions that can employ 
a large amount of resources will be able to shape association policy more strongly than 
factions with fewer resources. This is nothing new, but decision makers might have to 
keep these observations in mind when evaluating industry positions.
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Formal presentation of model, proofs
A.1 Basic assumptions
There are four actors: a political entrepreneur, E, and three lobbyists: SME, MNC, and 
SHI. As a general symbol for the lobbyists, I use l. Each lobbyist has an ideal policy out-
come in a two-dimensional policy space, il. Also, each lobbyist has a lobbying budget, bl. 
The game sequence:
1. E selects an association policy, c, and selective incentives, s.
2.  SME and MNC split their budget such that lbˆ  supports c and lb – lbˆ  supports li . By 
assumption, SHIbˆ  = 0.
3. One of the supported proposals becomes law: o ∈ { 
li , c } (where o stands for “out-
come”).
The level of selective incentives that l receives, ls , is some function of lbˆ  such that
ls ( lbˆ  = 0) = 0. 
Policy li  becomes law with probability 
ll
ll
l b
bb
ip
∑
−
=
ˆ
)( , and c becomes law with probability 
ll
ll
b
b
cp
∑
∑
=
ˆ
)( . The utilities are as follows:
)ˆ,ˆ( SMEMNCe bbfu =  (10)
with 0ˆ >∂
∂
l
e
b
u
.
ul = – p(iSME)||il – iSME ||l – p(iMNC)||il – iMNC||l
– p(c)||il – c ||l – p(iSHI)||il – iSHI ||l + sl )ˆ( lb . (11)
Policy preferences are based on negative Euclidean distances; l ’s policy benefi t from 
outcome o is
–||il – o||l = –   αl,x(il,x – ox)2 + αl,y(il,y – oy)2 , (12)
where x and y refer to the two dimensions of the policy space and α l, x and α l, y are 
weights that l attaches to the two policy dimensions.
Appendix
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A.2 Constant c
Proposition 1 If s = 0 and c = {m,n}, where m and n are two constants, then lbˆ = 0 for 
all l.
Proof For all l, ||il – c||l > ||il  – il ||l = 0. Since 0ˆ,
ˆ
)( <
∂
∂
=
∑
∑
i
i
ll
ll
b
u
b
b
cp  for all li ∈ .
Lemma 1 Assume s = 0. If 
αSME,x ≠ 
αMNC,x
αSME,y αMNC,y , then there is a c
~ such that
)0ˆ|0ˆ()ˆ|ˆ( ==>== kllkklll bbubbbbu  for all { }MNCSMEkl ,, ∈ ,
 
Proof )0ˆ|0ˆ()ˆ,ˆ|ˆ( ===== kllkklll bbubbcbbu , if s = 0, if
ĉ = ( bSME iSME ,x +  bMNC iMNC,x , bSME + bMNC   bSME + bMNC
bSME iSME ,y + 
bMNC iMNC,y) (13)bSME + bMNC  bSME + bMNC
(compare page 18). The question is if there are any points c~ such that
.,)ˆ,ˆ|ˆ()ˆ,~|ˆ( klbbcbbubbcbbu kklllkklll ∀==>==   (14)
Since the probability of SHIi  is a constant, equation 14 reduces to
.,ˆ~ lcici llll ∀−−>−−   (15)
Note that 
ll
ci ˆ−
 
describes a strictly convex preference set, call it )ˆ(cPl , such that l strictly 
prefers all points c’ inside this set, or, equivalently, for which ˆ
llll
cici −<′−  Similarly, 
we can defi ne )ˆ(cPk . If ≠∩ )ˆ()ˆ( cPcP kl Ø, then both l and k prefer any )ˆ()ˆ(
~ cPcPc kl ∩∈  to cˆ.
≠∩ )ˆ()ˆ( cPcP kl  Ø if and only if .
ˆˆ cx
kk
cx
ll
c
ci
c
ci
∂
−∂
≠
∂
−∂
 
 (16)
Without loss of generality, assume that iSME,x < iMNC,x and iSME,y < iMNc,y . Then it is 
easy to check that
cˆ ={λ iSME,x + (1– λ) iMNC,x , λ iSME,y + (1λ) iMNC,y},  (17)
with λ ,
MNCSME
SME
bb
b
+
=
 
 makes SME and MNC indifferent between ll bb =ˆ  and 0ˆ =lb , 
assuming s = 0.
To simplify notation, say that
bl =   αl,x (il,x – xcˆ )2 + αl,y (il,y – ycˆ )2.  (18)
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Now, by setting uSME )ˆ(c = uSME (c) we get
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Similarly, setting uMNC )ˆ(c  = uMNC (c) produces 
.
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Taking the fi rst derivatives at cˆ , it is easily checked that the two derivatives  
are equal if and only if 
αSME,x = 
αMNC,x
αSME,y αMNC,y . (21)
Lemma 2 If )ˆ( lbfs = , then ll bb =ˆ  if 
llll
MNCSMEl
bbci
bbb
s
≤≤−
+
>
∂
∂ ˆ0,~
1
ˆ  (22)
where c~ is the common policy proposal.
Proof ll bb =ˆ  if 0ˆ >∂
∂
l
l
b
u
 
for all lbˆ . It is easy to check that the lemma follows.
α
α
α
α
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A.3 c as a function of lbˆ
Take the following mechanism to determine c :
{c = if bˆ SME = bSME and bˆ MNC = 0if bˆ MNC = bMNC and bˆ SME = 0if bˆ MNC = bMNC and bˆSME = bSME
if bˆ MNC = 0 and bSME = 0
iSME
iMNC
c~
k
 
(23)
The last case is irrelevant because the probability of c =k becoming policy is zero.
Proposition 2 Under the mechanism specifi ed in equation 23, there is always a c~ such 
that )0ˆ()ˆ( === lllll bubbu  for },{ SMEMNCl ∈ , as long as s = 0. If 
αSME,y ≠ 
αMNC,y
αSME,x αMNC,x , there 
is always a c~ such that )0ˆ()ˆ( =>= lllll bubbu  for },{ SMEMNCl ∈ .
Proof The game can be summarized in normal form; for notational simplicity, denote 
the expected utility over the set of possible outcomes, }),{( ⋅Eul  for },{ SMEMNCl ∈ .
SMEbˆ
SMEb 0
MNCb },
~{( SHIl icEu ) },,{( SHIMNCSMEl iiiEu )
MNCbˆ 0 },,{( SHIMNCSMEl iiiEu ) },,{( SHIMNCSMEl iiiEu )
Again, without loss of generality assume that xMNCxSME ii ,, <  and yMNCySME ii ,, < . If c
~= cˆ  
(compare page 18), it is easy to check that )},,{()},ˆ{( SHIMNCSMElSHIl iiiEuicEu = . From 
Lemma 1, if 
αSME,y ≠ 
αMNC,y
αSME,x αMNC,x 
, )},ˆ{()},~{( SHIlSHIl icEuicEu > .
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